Reversing Progress

Yekepa-Buchanan -In a move that has stunned both industry observers and Liberia’s international partners, the Liberian government has reportedly reversed the Inter-Ministerial Concessions Committee (IMCC)’s decision to retain ArcelorMittal Liberia (AML) as the operator of the Yekepa-Buchanan railway. This decision not only weakens Liberia’s investment credibility but also threatens to unravel nearly two decades of hard-earned progress in rail infrastructure development.

The railway in question, rehabilitated and operated by ArcelorMittal under the terms of its Mineral Development Agreement (MDA), is Liberia’s most strategic economic corridor. It is not just a piece of infrastructure; it is the artery through which the country’s largest source of foreign direct investment flows. To suddenly jeopardize the legal and operational framework that has guided the system since 2006 is an act of self-sabotage at a time when Liberia can least afford it.

A History of Good Faith and Compliance

Contrary to the political noise that now surrounds the debate, the right of third-party access and the reversion of ownership of the rail and port to the Government of Liberia were clearly established in the First Amendment to AML’s MDA, ratified in 2007. AML has never opposed shared use of the railway. On the contrary, it has participated in multiple discussions over the years with potential third-party users. These engagements failed not because of AML’s resistance, but due to external factors including political interference, economic instability, and the collapse of would-be partners.

Take the case of SMFG, now owned by High Power Exploration (HPX). The original owners, BHP, held discussions with ArcelorMittal in 2010 to form a joint venture across the Guinean-Liberian border, but the talks collapsed over valuation disagreements. Even later, when AML expressed willingness to acquire SMFG from BHP, the Government of Guinea blocked the arrangement, preferring a different political path via Rio Tinto. This refusal had nothing to do with AML’s openness, and everything to do with Guinea’s internal politics.

Sable Mining was another aspirant in 2013, but their approach to rail access was commercially incoherent. They demanded AML purchase their ore at the border, without providing critical specifications necessary for technical and economic feasibility. Their collapse during the Ebola crisis and amid corruption scandals, including the high-profile Varney Sherman saga, further demonstrated that AML’s rail was not the issue. The issue was—and remains—the lack of viable third-party players.

A Dangerous Precedent

Given this history, the government’s decision to strip AML of operator status appears driven more by political expedience and external lobbying than sound economic strategy. No Liberian mining company has ever requested access to the railway. Only Guinean companies—those without Liberian obligations, jobs, or infrastructure commitments—have tried and failed to secure credible usage. Yet it is AML that has consistently upgraded and maintained the rail system, at no profit to itself when operating it for third parties.

It is also important to underscore that the IMCC’s recent recommendation to keep AML as operator was not unilateral—it followed extensive consultations and was embedded in the Third Amendment to the MDA, which outlines the Rail System Operating Principles (RSOP). Under these principles, third-party access is permitted, AML operates the system at cost (not for profit), and the Government maintains regulatory and supervisory control, including the right to revoke AML’s operating role in case of non-performance. It is a balanced framework—a governance model that promotes shared access without sacrificing operational efficiency.

Undermining Confidence and Investment

By reversing this decision, the government is sending a chilling signal to current and potential investors: that long-term agreements, infrastructure contributions, and adherence to regulatory frameworks can be overturned for short-term political gain. This not only endangers AML’s multi-billion-dollar Phase II expansion but also threatens thousands of Liberian jobs, social development projects, and regional economic stability.

Moreover, the reversal may expose Liberia to legal liabilities for breaching the sanctity of a ratified agreement. Investor confidence, once lost, is not easily regained. If the government believes that foreign pressure or alternative operators will better serve national interests, it must prove so with facts, transparency, and lawful process—not reckless U-turns that risk Liberia’s development trajectory.

The Way Forward

Instead of dismantling a working model, the government should focus on strengthening regulatory oversight, improving coordination between stakeholders, and ensuring that any third-party access is technically feasible, commercially sound, and legally compliant. Liberia must not trade stability for expediency.

If we are to attract serious investment and build a credible infrastructure backbone for the future, decisions like these must be made with sober judgment—not driven by foreign lobbying, misinformation, or political short-termism. Liberia deserves better. And so do the thousands of citizens whose livelihoods depend on the continued growth of our mining sector.

Wilson